The rise of Asymmetric Warfare
Over the past 50 years, modern states have failed to win low intensity conflicts (LICs). The record of failure is vast: France in Vietnam, Vietnam in Cambodia, Russia in Afghanistan, and Israel in Lebanon. All of these conflicts have resulted in a huge loss of life (In Afghanistan, Russia lost 30 k soldiers while the Afghans lost 2 m), massive economic costs (the US war in Vietnam costs $1 trillion in 2001 dollars), and unacceptable political instability. In response to this failure, modern states have opted to avoid LICs and have retreated into isolation.
That isolation was ended on 9-11 with the rise of Asymmetrical warfare. This style of warfare pits a modern state against a group of loosely aligned groups. These groups are different than the guerilla fighters we faced previously. They differ in the following ways:
1) They are willing to bring the conflict to us. Additionally, the infrastructure of the modern state both enables and increases the lethality of these attacks (Our mail and transportation systems were used in the most recent attacks). Isolation is not an option.
2) They operate transnationally. Asymmetric warrior groups recruit, train, and stage attacks across the globe. There isn't a center of gravity that we can retaliate against.
3) The goals of Asymmetric groups are confused and impossible to implement. Negotiation is not an option.
How do we fight and win an Asymmetric war given the factors above? How can we hope to win given our track record in the last half century of losses in low intensity conflicts? The answer isn't appetizing. I will post some ideas on a solution later.
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